



Quelle

U.S. Department of State: The economic interdependence of Germany and Western Europe. Means for achieving closer economic association (Washington 1949)¹

[...] A segregated Germany, which developed in a manner unrelated to Western Europe would constitute a danger to Western Europe and our objectives. Economically, the interrelationship of Germany and the rest of Western Europe is so close and Germany's economic potential so great that if it were again to pursue a policy of seeking only its own economic well-being and the greatest degree of autarchy, it might well dominate Western Europe. Further, the maintenance of a recovered Western European economy would be much more difficult and perhaps even impossible. Politically, a segregated Germany would be under irresistible temptation to seek, through its central geographic position and potential strength, to achieve dominance in Europe, playing off the East against the West. [...]

Since a Germany separate from Western Europe and with freedom of action presents the dangers described above, the most fruitful longrun approach seems to be to try so to integrate the economic and strategic interests of Germany with those of its Western neighbors as to diminish the incentives and opportunities for separate disruptive action. The economic interdependences of these countries, both as suppliers and purchasers of goods lays a basis for such a close economic association. Further, such a close association would bring advantages both to Germany and to the other Western nations quite aside from promoting a solution of the German problem. [...]

If Germany is to fit into a Western European community, such a community must exist, and must be adequate to handle the German problem. The development of collective action and a joint approach to regional and world problems has been an important aspect of American policy in recent years. This has been particularly true in relation to Europe, where we have fostered various institutions and arrangements based on the concept of the necessity for mutual aid and a common approach to common problems. The two most important steps in this direction have been ERP, including the formation of the OEEC, and the North Atlantic Treaty. [...]

It is doubtful whether the OEEC is an adequate framework within which to achieve really close integration. It is not yet clear whether it will survive in any significant form after American ERP aid ends. To date it has been principally a forum for negotiation between members and while, as recovery proceeds, OEEC may develop effective power of its own in the economic field, that development cannot be assumed. Furthermore, the membership is probably broader than would be necessary to deal with the German problem. [...]

The most practicable approach toward establishing a community into which Germany will fit seems to be along the line of fostering the development of close economic interrelationship. Not only has the idea of closer economic association developed further than other forms, but the economic interdependences of Germany and Western Europe is more widely recognized. It seems politically unfeasible and unrealistic to start along the line of including Germany in the framework of the Brussels or North Atlantic Pacts, whose principal significance is military – unfeasible because of the strong and justified Western European fears of German rearmament, unrealistic in view of our declared policy of preventing German rearmament.

What is the minimum area which it is essential to include in a community which would achieve the economic and political ends sought? This cannot be approached purely in economic terms. Adequate counterbalances to German potential power are necessary, politically as well as economically. Aside from necessary security controls, Germany must be treated as a coordinate responsible

1 Auszüge aus einem undatierten Grundsatzpapier des State Department, Washington [März 1949], Top Secret, FRUS, 1949, III, S. 131-135. Der Titel der Quelle wurde sinngemäß hinzugefügt.

member of such a grouping. France, Benelux, Italy, Austria and as many as possible of the Scandinavian countries seem the very minimum to counterbalance Germany. Iceland, Greece, Turkey, Portugal and Ireland are of considerably lesser importance in an economic sense. Switzerland cannot be expected to abandon neutrality; Spain is now politically unacceptable, as are the satellites.

The U.K. presents the most difficult problem. [...] The U.K. might well be needed to counterbalance Germany in any community. The U.K., however, has wider affiliations with the rest of the world than do the continental countries. [...] It might be necessary to work out a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and a closely-knit European community.

The U.S. role in this matter should not be one of passive encouragement. So long as we are occupying Germany, and particularly in view of our insistence on a controlling voice in German foreign economic matters, we have a direct responsibility for action in Europe. Furthermore, any movement toward strengthening Europe and resolving the German problem would further the objectives of the North Atlantic Pact. Such a movement will need all the impetus that can be given it [...]. [...]

Among the specific techniques which would have to be explored as means for achieving closer economic association are currency arrangements [...], customs union (total or limited), coordination or integration of trade negotiations with other countries, abolition or relaxation of barriers to movement of people, coordinated investment policy, et cetera. The examination of these techniques will necessarily require consideration of the degree to which it would be necessary for members of the group to adopt coordinated or a single policy on prices and wages, social services, taxation, banking and credit, subsidies, rationing, allocations, foreign exchange and trade controls, exchange rates, cartel policy, et cetera. These matters would inevitably bring to the fore divergencies in economic, social and political philosophy, e.g., private ownership vs. nationalization, the controlled economy vs. the economy regulated by the price mechanism and private initiative. It is probable that any realistic analysis of these problems would lead to the conclusion that the delegation of very considerable powers to a central authority would be necessary. [...]

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Auf diese Quelle bezieht sich ein einführender und erläuternder Essay von Herbst, Ludolf, *Deutschland und Europa aus amerikanischer Sicht. Ein geheimes Grundsatzpapier des US-State Department aus dem Jahr 1949* im zuvor genannten Sammelband, S. 436-440.